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Summary 
The rapid ascendancy of social protection up the development policy agenda in the past ten 
to 15 years raises questions about whether its current prominence will be sustained, or 
whether it will turn out to be just another development fad that declines and ultimately 
disappears. If social protection does remain high on the agenda, what trajectory will it follow, 
which actors will drive it forward and what will be the main issues and challenges it faces? 
This project attempted to find some answers, under the broad question: Where next for 
social protection? 
A range of research methods was used, including (1) a review of forward-looking academic 
literature and social protection strategies of development agencies; (2) interviews with 20 key 
informants who are leading global thinkers in social protection; (3) a four-day moderated 
online discussion involving more than 200 participants; (4) two Foresight workshops with 18 
participants that used three forecasting methods – drivers of change analysis, scenario 
building, and windtunnelling. 
The literature on social protection traces its evolution from its origins in the ‘social safety 
nets’ of the 1980s through to the rights-based ‘Social Protection Floor’ that was adopted by 
all of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 183 member states in 2012. As social 
protection has evolved from a set of uncoordinated ad hoc projects to a more holistic vision 
of society, so the need for a systemic approach with social protection linked to other social 
and economic sectors has become increasingly recognised. This is reflected in several 
recent social protection strategies of governments and agencies – for example, the title of 
UNICEF’s policy framework, published in 2012, is ‘Integrated Social Protection Systems’. 
Across the world, social protection is at different stages of development, from ‘limited’ 
coverage in low-income countries with high needs but limited fiscal resources through to 
‘consolidated’ systems in middle-income countries with well-developed social assistance and 
social insurance mechanisms. In some countries in Latin America, social protection started 
in the 1920s with contributory social insurance for formal sector workers but has more 
recently become dominated by government-run conditional cash transfer programmes such 
as Bolsa Familia in Brazil. Asia is a very heterogeneous region with diverse trajectories. 
Crudely, social insurance has been dominant in East and Southeast Asia since the mid-
twentieth century, social assistance is more prevalent in South Asia – with recent shifts from 
food to cash and towards rights-based approaches – and there is a long-standing balance 
between assistance and insurance in Central Asia, while food and fuel subsidies absorb 
much of the social protection budgets of countries in the Middle East. Social protection in 
Africa evolved out of humanitarian relief interventions such as food aid and public works, but 
has recently seen a rapid proliferation of unconditional cash transfer projects, though 
coverage remains extremely low. 
Drivers of change that might influence social protection in the coming years can be classified 
across five broad categories: social, technological, economic, environmental and political – 
‘STEEP’. Relevant social drivers include rising inequality, demographic shifts (both ageing 
and youthful populations), migration and urbanisation, all of which will shift the nature of 
vulnerability and patterns of need for social protection. Technological advances are likely to 
lead to enhanced delivery of social protection, while the spread of social media could 
improve awareness of social protection rights and enforce government accountability. A 
positive economic driver is economic growth while negative drivers include economic 
volatility and increasing ‘flexibilisation’ of labour markets, with the associated loss of social 
security benefits. Climate change and its unpredictable consequences for rural livelihoods is 
the main environmental driver identified in this project. Finally, political drivers operate at 
many levels, from trends in multilateral and bilateral development policies and aid flows to 
political commitment at national level. 
6 
Among many issues that are expected to dominate debates in the next phase of social 
protection’s evolution, five stood out. 
1. Donor agencies and some governments are becoming preoccupied with building 
national systems for social protection, though this requires adequate capacity, which 
is often lacking, as well as coordination between development partners. 
2. The challenge of fiscal affordability remains a major barrier to the expansion of 
social protection, especially in low-income countries with high levels of poverty and 
vulnerability but a low tax base. 
3. Work is urgently needed to improve the understanding of political processes 
around social protection policy, including the roles of civil society and social 
accountability mechanisms and the challenge of delivering social protection in fragile 
states, given that much attention has focused on ‘building the evidence base’ and not 
enough on understanding the political drivers that result in social protection being 
either adopted or resisted by governments. 
4. There is a drive towards strengthening linkages with labour markets, firstly by 
enhancing access to employment opportunities through social protection, secondly by 
extending social insurance to the informal sector, thirdly by replicating ‘graduation’ 
programmes that deliver packages of social protection plus livelihood support to move 
people out of poverty. 
5. Despite its rapid rise as a development policy agenda, actual coverage of social 
protection programmes remains very low, especially in low-income regions like sub-
Saharan Africa, and much more investment and advocacy are needed to reach those 
who are currently excluded. 
Participants in the Foresight workshops identified two fundamental drivers for analysing 
trajectories of social protection under alternative possible future scenarios: 
‘progressive/regressive politics’, and ‘high/low institutional capacity’. Three scenarios were 
selected for in-depth analysis: 
 Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’: progressive local politics, progressive 
international politics, low institutional capacity 
 Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’: regressive local politics, progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
 Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’: regressive local politics, regressive international 
politics, high institutional capacity. 
This scenario-building exercise revealed that there is no single linear pathway for social 
protection, but multiple trajectories that are highly context-specific and subject to change 
over time, as political ideologies shift domestically and in the global development discourse, 
and as institutional capacities either grow or are undermined. A ‘windtunnelling’ exercise 
selected different policies and tested them for feasibility against each scenario. Here the 
nature of the country’s political regime emerged as the most fundamental determinant of 
which policies will be adopted. Rights-based approaches such as the Social Protection Floor 
might be adopted by progressive governments, while regressive governments will prefer 
minimalist safety nets and contributory social security schemes. Better understanding of 
political processes is needed to protect gains made in social protection systems against 
possible reversals when the political climate shifts against pro-poor redistributive policies. 
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1 Introduction 
Social protection is incontrovertibly one of the success stories of development policy in the 
early twenty-first century. Every year new social protection programmes are launched, more 
countries adopt a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) or National Social Protection 
Strategy (NSPS), and rigorous evaluations generate further empirical evidence of the 
positive impacts of various forms of social protection. Current trends in social protection 
thinking and practice are taking two potentially contradictory directions: crudely, ‘rights-
based’ versus ‘growth-oriented’. 
1. rights-based: institutionalising social protection in national policy frameworks, 
underpinned by legislation that endows justiciable claims to social protection 
entitlements to all citizens or residents, including refugees; 
2. growth-oriented: using social protection instrumentally, as a toolkit for achieving 
poverty reduction and economic growth; for example, by ‘exiting’ participants out of 
programmes when they reach a ‘graduation’ threshold. 
These two directions are not necessarily mutually exclusive but their inherently different 
focus on what social protection aims to achieve tends to result in different emphases in terms 
of who should receive what type of support, under what conditions and for how long. 
The trajectory of social protection as a policy discourse is worthy of scrutiny. Although ‘social 
safety nets’ were introduced as a response to economic crises in the 1980s or before, the 
broader concept of social protection originated in the late 1990s. It was encapsulated first in 
the World Bank’s growth-oriented ‘Social Risk Management’ framework (World Bank 2001), 
and later advanced by rights-based frameworks such as IDS’ ‘Transformative Social 
Protection’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) and ILO’s ‘Social Protection Floor’ (ILO 
2011). In the mid-2000s the analysis shifted to specific design issues (e.g. targeting, 
dependency syndrome) and efforts to build the evidence base on impacts of specific 
instruments (e.g. conditional cash transfers, school feeding). In the 2010s the focus has 
moved on to establishing social protection as a policy sector within government ministries 
and to challenges of coordination and systematisation (e.g. building a ‘single registry’). 
Since the introduction of ‘social safety nets’ in the 1980s, social protection has expanded 
greatly as a component of social policy. Common indicators used to measure this growth 
include the number of social protection policies in place, the percentage of the population 
covered by such policies and the proportion of public expenditures allocated to social 
protection (ILO 2014). The ‘Social Protection Index’ (ADB 2013) captures both the ‘breadth’ 
and ‘depth’ of social protection coverage, measured by the number of beneficiaries and the 
level of benefits provided by social protection programmes. 
This crude trajectory raises an obvious question: where next for social protection? We 
identify three broad potential scenarios: (a) expansion; (b) plateau; (c) decline. 
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Figure 1.1 Potential future trajectories of social protection 
 2000 2015 2025 
(a) Expansion 
Social protection continues to grow both conceptually 
and operationally, generating interesting new issues to 
research, new policies to design and new programmes 
to evaluate.  
(b) Plateau 
Social protection becomes entrenched as a permanent 
fixture of development discourse, consolidating its place 
in government and donor policy and steadily increasing 
its coverage.  
(c) Decline 
Social protection becomes just another development 
fashion that follows a conventional project cycle, peaking 
around 2015 but declining thereafter, just as rapidly as it 
rose. 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Against this backdrop, this project aimed to do the following: 
1. to critically review the policy discourse on social protection since its origins in the 
late 1990s and how it has been shaped by the main influencing actors; 
2. to identify and explore themes that are likely to be high on the social protection 
agenda in the short to medium term; 
3. to identify drivers of change that are likely to shape the social protection landscape in 
the medium to long term and to develop and test future scenarios for social 
protection; 
4. to identify entry points for responding to future themes, challenges and opportunities 
that will shape the future of social protection and determine appropriate forms of 
ongoing engagement. 
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodologies used for each 
component of this research. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the current ‘state of play’ 
with respect to social protection globally and in three world regions (Latin America, Asia and 
the Pacific, and Africa). Section 4 explores the ‘drivers of change’ likely to affect social 
protection in the coming period, under the five ‘STEEP’ categories: social, technological, 
economic, environmental, political. Section 5 unpacks expected trajectories of social 
protection by considering the main issues and debates that might affect which trajectory is 
actually followed. Section 6 looks forward by describing potential future scenarios and policy 
options for social protection in the next ten to 15 years, drawing on the Foresight 
methodology. Section 7 concludes. Four annexes provide: the questionnaire designed for 
key informant interviews; an overview of the Foresight methodology; a list of individuals who 
were interviewed as ‘key informants’; and a list of participants in the Foresight workshops. 
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2 Research methods 
The research questions identified under this project require looking ahead and predicting the 
future by extrapolating from the current state of play and the recent trajectory of social 
protection as a policy agenda. This demands a different set of research methods and tools to 
conventional research projects. It is important to emphasise that this project aimed to elicit 
views and opinions from a wide audience regarding the future possible trajectories of social 
protection. We do not pull out conclusions or impose our own opinions about the most likely 
future scenario, nor do we offer recommendations about what roles different actors should be 
playing. 
An eclectic mix of methods was designed and implemented: 
1. a background literature review of relevant and secondary data; 
2. structured one-on-one interviews with key informants active in social protection 
policymaking, conceptualisation or research; 
3. a moderated online discussion event that engaged a wider audience interested in or 
working on social protection from across the world; 
4. two face-to-face Foresight workshops involving internal IDS and external 
participants. 
2.1 Literature review 
A review of secondary literature was undertaken to provide background contextual 
information for the primary data collection activities. The literature review had two main 
objectives. The first was to describe the evolution of social protection as a policy agenda 
across the world and in specific regions since its origins in the 1990s. The second was to 
identify trends in social protection thinking by key stakeholders, with a view to projecting 
forward into social protection thinking and practice in the future. This review did not intend to 
be exhaustive or even extensive, rather we identified about 30 widely cited documents that 
provided useful information and insights towards addressing these two objectives. 
Three main types of documents were reviewed. For descriptive information on the state of 
social protection across the world, overview reports such as the ILO’s World Social 
Protection Report 2014/15 were especially valuable. Regional analyses drew on documents 
from regional agencies, including the African Union (AU), the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). 
For understanding the current thinking of agencies that are driving the design and financing 
of many social protection programmes and systems in low-income countries, as well as the 
challenges that these actors face in achieving their social protection objectives in their 
development cooperation activities, we reviewed the latest social protection strategies or 
policy statements by agencies including the European Commission, the Organisation for 
European Co-operation and Development (OECD), ILO, United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank. 
Finally, relevant academic journal articles which analyse major thematic as well as regional 
trends in the social protection field were consulted (see the list of ‘References’ for details). 
These provide insights both on historical developments as well as potential future trajectories 
of social protection in different global regions and economic contexts. 
2.2 Key informant interviews 
A small group of influential social protection thinkers and practitioners was approached and 
asked to be interviewed for their opinions and insights on the future of social protection. 
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Interviewees were purposively selected, sometimes using a snowballing technique, based on 
the authors’ assessment of each interviewee’s contribution to social protection thinking 
and/or practice. Only one individual declined to be interviewed. 
Interviewees included representatives of (see Annex 3 for a complete list): 
 Bilateral development agencies – Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
DFAT), Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA), UK (DFID) 
 United Nations agencies – ILO, UNICEF, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), World Bank 
 International non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – International Council on 
Social Welfare, Save the Children 
 Universities and research institutes – Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI, 
South Africa), International Development Research Centre (IDRC, Canada), 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, USA), ODI (UK), University of 
Manchester (UK). 
All interviewees were told that their responses might be quoted and acknowledged in this 
research report. Most gave their informed consent. In a few cases where consent was not 
given, these responses were either anonymised or deleted. Interviews were conducted by 
Skype or telephone, following a structured questionnaire that was designed for this purpose 
(appended as Annex 1). 
Interviewees were told in advance that the interview would take approximately 30 to 40 
minutes, and that the following topics would be covered: 
 whether social protection is likely to become more or less prominent in development 
policy in the coming years; 
 major issues and emerging debates in social protection thinking in the next five to ten 
years; 
 key factors and actors likely to shape the evolution of the social protection agenda; 
 regional differences or potential convergences in the evolution of social protection 
policy; 
 practical challenges in building national social protection systems. 
2.3 Online discussion 
The Centre for Social Protection (CSP), with the support of Knowledge Services at the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and Elliptics Ltd, facilitated an online discussion event 
on the topic ‘Where next for Social Protection?’, which ran for four days, from 9 to 12 
September 2014. The online discussion was structured around four questions, one for each 
day. 
 Day 1 – Predicting the future: 
Do you think that social protection will become more or less prominent in the 
development policy agenda in the next five to ten years? Why? 
 Day 2 – Issues and debates: 
What will be the most important issues and debates in social protection in the next 
five to ten years? 
 Day 3 – Drivers of change: 
What will be the most important drivers of change affecting social protection in the 
next five to ten years? 
 Day 4 – The way forward: 
What needs to be done, and by which actors, to ensure that social protection remains 
high on the development policy agenda in the coming five to ten years? What can we 
do? 
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More than 200 participants registered for the online discussion from all over the world, which 
contributed to a wide diversity of opinions and experiences being shared with the group. Just 
over half of the participants came from or were based in Africa, Asia or Latin America, while 
just under half came from Europe (including the UK) or North America. 
Altogether 138 postings were made at an average of 34 postings each day. 
Figure 2.1 Online discussion participants by region 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.4 Foresight workshops 
Two ‘Foresight’ workshops were hosted by the Centre for Social Protection at the Institute of 
Development Studies, on 22 September and 17 November 2014. The workshops brought 
together 18 people who work intensively on social protection, from research institutes (IDS, 
International Poverty Centre (IPC), ITAD, ODI, Oxford Policy Management (OPM)), donors 
(DFID) and NGOs (Save the Children) (see Annex 4 for the full list of participants). The 
workshops were jointly facilitated by Horizon Scanning and the Centre for Social Protection. 
Three forecasting methods were used in the two workshops: drivers of change analysis, 
scenario building, and windtunnelling (see Annex 2 for a detailed description of the Foresight 
methodology). 
1. Drivers of change analysis: Workshop participants brainstormed around the driving 
forces in the broader contextual environment that are likely to influence the direction 
of social protection programming and systems-building in the next ten to 15 years, 
under five ‘STEEP’ categories – social (demographics, lifestyles, social trends, etc); 
technology (ICTs, media, etc); economy (economic policies, growth rates); 
environment (climate change, natural resource management), and politics (welfare 
regimes, development policies and international aid flows). 
2. Scenario building: Workshop participants selected two of the most powerful drivers 
identified in the ‘drivers of change’ exercise, and constructed four scenario ‘spaces’, 
using one driver as an x-axis and the other driver as a y-axis to create four quadrants. 
These scenarios were developed into narratives by reflecting on what kind of world 
each quadrant in the scenario represents, and the implications of that possible future 
world for social protection programming. 
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3. Windtunnelling: Next, the workshop participants proposed several possible social 
protection policies to be introduced into the scenarios, and discussed how effectively 
each policy would perform given the contextual situation described for each scenario. 
The purpose was to identify what is possible in terms of robust social protection 
measures under different possible future conditions in specific country contexts. 
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3 Current state of play of social protection by 
region 
With such widespread recognition, and much empirical evidence to substantiate the 
case for social protection, including possibilities to limit costs and disincentives, one 
could be forgiven for being only optimistic regarding the future development of social 
protection as a core part of the development agenda. 
(de Haan 2014: 315) 
Social protection has been one of the youngest, yet fastest-growing sectors in international 
development since the late 1990s. Building on the ‘social safety nets’ that were introduced 
across Latin America, Africa and South and East Asia in the 1980s following a series of 
economic crises and structural adjustment reforms, the importance of providing protection to 
poor and vulnerable people became increasingly recognised even in non-crisis contexts. 
Until recently, however, social protection in practice was dominated by projects and 
programmes, often externally designed and financed, with little traction in the domestic 
political discourse. Most commonly these interventions took the form of discrete projects 
such as public works (food-for-work) or school feeding schemes. 
Social protection emerged as a broader set of responses, reaching people not covered by 
formal social security schemes or social welfare benefits. Social protection became popular 
among donor agencies as part of an ‘inclusive neo-liberal’ agenda (Craig and Porter 2005), 
yet the term itself remained contested and its definition and purpose still varies across 
agencies and governments. Different actors have approached social protection from a range 
of pragmatic and ideological angles – ‘from macroeconomic stabilizer to humanitarian 
responses; from risk management to promoting social justice’ (Gentilini and Omamo 2011: 
329). Many low-income countries initially resisted social protection, believing that it would 
generate ‘dependency’ and be fiscally unaffordable at scale. This perception is changing, 
however, and even the world’s poorest countries now have social protection policies or 
strategies. 
The global financial crisis in 2008–09 played a big role, once again, in making the case for 
social protection as a public policy instrument to protect the most vulnerable from economic 
shocks and instability. Approximately a quarter of the funds for stimulus packages in 48 high- 
and middle-income countries, totalling US$2.4tn, were invested in counter-cyclical social 
protection measures. Optimism around placing social protection higher up the public policy 
agenda waned somewhat after 2010, when governments changed course and embarked on 
fiscal consolidation and premature contraction of expenditure. There are, however, divergent 
trends between richer and poorer areas, with many high-income countries contracting their 
social security systems while middle- and low-income countries are expanding theirs (ILO 
2014). Particularly middle-income countries are focusing efforts on expanding systems, while 
low-income countries are extending temporary safety nets targeted to the most vulnerable 
groups of the population (Andrews et al. 2012). Hubs of innovation of new types of social 
protection will predominantly be seen in emerging economies such as the ‘BRICS’ – 
especially Brazil, India, China and South Africa – which are increasingly shaping the social 
protection agenda (Barnett and Chalk 2010; Devereux 2010; Gentilini and Omamo 2011; 
Ribe, Robalino and Walker 2010). 
Social protection aims to reduce vulnerability as well as poverty, and different programmes 
and systems conceptualise vulnerability differently. Initially the focus was either on income 
vulnerability – sometimes defined simplistically as people with incomes no more than 20 per 
cent above the poverty line – or on demographic vulnerability – defined in terms of inability to 
earn an independent livelihood, such as persons with severe disability – but assistance was 
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provided mainly in material forms (cash grants). Recently the emphasis has shifted towards 
meeting human capital deficits for economic growth (e.g. through conditional cash transfer 
programmes), which links the poverty reduction and vulnerability objectives. Social protection 
is also concerning itself more with non-economic and non-material vulnerabilities, by 
strengthening linkages to social services including child protection and support to women’s 
unpaid care responsibilities. These trends seem likely to continue in the future. 
In an effort to move from ‘residual’ social protection towards more holistic and human-rights 
based approaches, the United Nations Systems Chief Executive Board for Coordination 
Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I), led by the ILO and World Health Organization 
(WHO), developed the concept of a universal ‘social protection floor’ and provided guidance 
on its implementation. The social protection floor integrates a set of social policies to 
guarantee income security and access to essential social services for all across the life-cycle, 
with particular attention paid to vulnerable groups (ILO 2011). This represents a holistic 
approach in linking the provision of services (‘supply-side’) with facilitating access to these 
services through income transfers (‘demand-side’). 
The social protection floor coincided with an emerging global consensus on the need for a 
systemic approach to social protection. The need for strengthening coordination and linkages 
with other social sectors and economic policies is reflected in recent social protection 
strategies and policy statements of several major international and multilateral organisations, 
including the OECD (2009), the European Commission (2012), UNICEF (2012), and the 
World Bank (2012a). 
Social protection has been developing differently across countries and regions, with high 
levels of specificity according to national contexts and political processes. Generalisations 
are thus difficult to make, but there have been several attempts to create a taxonomy of 
social protection models. Gentilini and Omamo (2011) define three types of social protection, 
which are characterised by the level of local ownership and institutionalisation in national 
processes (see also Figure 3.1): 
 ‘Consolidated’ social protection is institutionalised in national domestic budgets 
and political processes, as well as linked to formal labour markets. It includes both 
contributory social insurance and non-contributory social assistance, with the main 
challenge being to maintain and reform these systems and keep them financially 
sustainable. 
 ‘Emerging’ social protection can be found in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and 
Latin America. There are wide differences in the specific models, but usually 
international assistance plays a minor role in funding their set-up and most systems 
are domestically funded. The main focus in these countries lies on expanding social 
protection, particularly formal contributory social security, and improving the 
coordination, coverage, effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes. 
 ‘Limited’ social protection is found in countries where the need for social protection 
is high, but national fiscal capacity is limited. In some countries, social safety nets are 
donor-funded or basic longer-term social protection systems are slowly scaled up, as 
in Ethiopia. 
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Figure 3.1 A typology of social protection systems 
 
Source: Gentilini and Omamo (2011: 336). This article was published in Food Policy 36, ‘Social Protection 2.0: Exploring Issues, 
Evidence and Debates in a Globalizing World’, pp. 329–40. © Elsevier (2011). Permission to reuse this article must be 
requested directly from Elsevier. 
The level of advancement of social protection programmes, in terms of their 
institutionalisation and local ownership, differs in general terms across global regions. 
‘Limited’ social protection is more represented in sub-Saharan Africa, where fiscal and 
institutional capacity are restrained and donor dependence is high. ‘Consolidated’ 
programmes can mainly be found in industrialised countries in the ‘global North’, while 
‘emerging’ social protection is more dominant in emerging economies in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia. However, there are significant differences between countries within these 
global regions. Some general trends can be observed, which are highlighted in the following 
sub-sections. 
3.1 Latin America 
In Latin America, although the development of social protection programmes cannot be 
described as a homogenous process, there are some generalisable trends, which run 
parallel to the development model and the role of the state in the region at the time. Social 
security for the urban formal sector started early on in some Latin American countries. 
Following the Great Depression in 1929, social assistance started in the form of consumer 
subsidies for food and energy. The debt crisis in the early 1980s and the economic crisis in 
the late 1990s following structural adjustment policies shifted the focus of social assistance 
from universal subsidies to targeted social investment funds. Currently, there are two 
dominant approaches to social protection in Latin America. The first sees the state as a 
subsidiser and promoter of poor households, aiming to break the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty. The second follows a more rights-based approach to social 
protection and regards the state as a guarantor of a minimum standard (Cecchini and 
Martínez 2012: 27). 
The scale of social protection programmes and social investment per capita varies greatly 
across countries, not always being consistent with their level of economic development. 
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Cecchini and Martínez (2012: 48–49) identify three groups of countries with similar social 
investment indicators and common characteristics: 
1. countries with lowest social investment per capita: focus lies on non-contributory 
social protection initiatives, e.g. conditional cash transfers (CCTs) as a first step to 
extending protection to those who have been historically excluded (e.g. Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Peru); 
2. countries with medium social investment per capita: efforts lie in combine targeted 
non-contributory social transfers with initiatives for universal benefits (e.g. old-age 
pension in Mexico City); 
3. countries with highest social investment per capita: rights-based social protection 
systems in which non-contributory policies are coordinated to ensure or guarantee 
access to benefits offered by various programmes (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico). 
While contributory social insurance has existed in some countries for a minority of formal 
urban workers for several decades, social assistance, mainly in the form of ‘co-responsibility’ 
conditional cash transfer programmes, only emerged in the late 1990s as risk mitigation 
strategies, and are now expanding in the region as protection from risks and promotion out of 
poverty through the accumulation of human capital (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). The scale of 
these programmes varies greatly, the largest being Bolsa Familía in Brazil, which reaches 46 
million people or approximately a quarter of its population. Similar programmes with different 
types of outreach have been implemented in 16 other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries (ILO 2014: 19). 
Only 38 per cent of workers in Latin America are eligible for benefits (contributory and non-
contributory), which places a strong focus on integrating informal workers into the labour 
market (ILO 2014: xxii). To guarantee the financial sustainability of social protection, 
particularly with views towards an ageing population, it is necessary to make use of the youth 
dividend and to integrate informal workers into the formal labour market to enable them to 
contribute to their own pensions. Furthermore, the tax system needs to become more 
effective and efficient, increase its revenue base and move from mainly regressive to 
progressive taxes. 
In contrast to regions that only introduced social protection recently, Latin America is now 
facing ‘second generation’ systemic challenges, where the need to address high poverty and 
inequality levels calls for a better harmonisation of social assistance and social insurance 
programmes, and for increasing coverage (Andrews et al. 2012: 47). Issues related to 
governance of programmes are also rising to the fore, especially relationships between 
national and subnational levels of government, often linked to processes of decentralisation 
and the emergence of social accountability mechanisms at local (district and community) 
levels. 
3.2 Asia and the Pacific 
In Asia and the Pacific there is probably the highest level of heterogeneity between countries 
in terms of their economic development, as well as the advancement of social protection 
systems. South Asia has been at the forefront of social protection in the region with India 
implementing its first poverty alleviation scheme in the 1960s and Bangladesh putting 
pensions in place in the 1970s. Most countries now operate an extensive set of social 
protection programmes with public works programmes and employment guarantee schemes 
forming strong components in India and Bangladesh and gaining increasing prominence in 
Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan (Köhler, Cali and Stirbu 2009). Southeast Asia has a long-
standing experience with contributory social insurance schemes, particularly in 
‘developmental states’ including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The region has seen an 
expansion and reframing of social protection systems in countries such as Indonesia and 
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Thailand following the 1997–98 financial crisis and recognition that existing social safety nets 
did not provide adequate support against shocks (Cook 2009). 
In general, comprehensive social protection systems are not yet in place in the majority of 
countries, but there are increasing efforts from governments to scale up social protection – 
particularly after the global financial, food and fuel crisis and the recurrence of natural 
disasters in the region (ESCAP 2011). This section will draw some general trends, based on 
the Asian Development Bank’s social protection index (SPI). However, the high level of 
diversity in the region would require a more in-depth analysis per country of vulnerability 
profiles and factors beyond GDP per capita that enable or constrain the effectiveness of 
social protection programmes (Kabeer, Cook and Chopra 2010). 
All countries in the region have some sort of social protection, which can be used as ‘building 
blocks’ for systemic approaches. Yet, political and financial commitment to expand social 
protection varies. The ADB suggests that a social protection expenditure of 5 per cent of 
GDP per capita is a realistic medium-term objective for middle-income countries (MICs) in 
Asia – yet only four of the 35 countries in the region assessed by the ADB meet this 
standard. These are two high-income countries (HICs) – Japan and Republic of Korea – and 
two post-Soviet transition economies – Mongolia and Uzbekistan (ADB 2013: xiii). 
Nineteen countries in the region spend less than 2.5 per cent of GDP per capita on social 
protection, and only five among them are low-income countries (LICs) that are financially 
constrained. The rest are either low-middle-income or upper-middle-income countries, which 
should have sufficient resources in theory to scale up their social protection systems. The 
majority of low-middle-income and low-income countries fall significantly below the regional 
average for the social protection index, which is a weighted average of expenditure, 
coverage and proportion of poor people covered in the country in question (ADB 2013). 
There are also strong differences within the region, with East Asia demonstrating the highest 
SPI values, followed by Central and West Asia where many transition economies retained 
some social protection measures from the socialist era. Southeast Asia’s lower ranking is 
noteworthy, since it contains one HIC (Singapore) and several large MICs (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), and social protection expenditure is considered to be 
low considering that the region’s GDP per capita is above average. The Pacific and South 
Asia are the lowest ranking sub-regions in terms of average spending measures through the 
SPI, but they also have the lowest average GDP per capita. The average spending on social 
protection is less than 2 per cent of GDP. 
Of the types of social protection, social insurance is in general the predominant form in Asia 
and the Pacific, rather than social assistance and labour market programmes – particularly in 
East Asia and Southeast Asia. In Central and West Asia social insurance is dominant, but 
there is more of a balance with social assistance programmes, and in South Asia social 
assistance programmes are approaching the same levels as social insurance, but informal 
social protection continues to play a predominant role, as it does in the Pacific. However, 
many forms of informal social protection are breaking down due to forces of ‘modernisation’ 
and globalisation, and are less equipped to address increasingly frequent covariant shocks in 
the region (Kidd et al. 2009; ESCAP 2011). 
Among social insurance programmes, pensions and health insurance stand out as the most 
important, with unemployment benefits constituting on average only 1 per cent of all social 
protection expenditure, but higher in richer countries. Social assistance programmes in the 
region are characterised by cash or in-kind transfers and child welfare programmes, 
comprising a third of the expenditure. The rest are disaster relief programmes, assistance to 
the elderly and health assistance, as well as disability benefits (which are the significantly 
smallest sub-component). Labour market programmes comprise a relatively small part of 
social protection in the region, and consist mainly of skills development training programmes 
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and cash-/food-for-work programmes. There are some important innovations in rights-based 
approaches in the form of ‘employment guarantee schemes’ in India, Bangladesh and Nepal 
(Köhler et al. 2009). 
The dominance of social insurance is problematic, since the region has the highest levels of 
labour market informality of all the global regions. Social insurance only benefits a minority of 
workers in the formal sector, and social assistance targets only the poorest households in a 
fragmented and inefficient way. This leaves a ‘missing middle’ of low-income, vulnerable 
households around the poverty line who work in the informal sector and have no access to 
benefits. There are few universal programmes in the region, and extending health insurance 
will pose a question of financial sustainability. However, with most countries due to reach 
middle-income status soon, the question is more around ensuring the revenue-generating 
capacity of governments and making the expansion of social protection a political priority. 
Despite most countries having some form of social protection, it is yet not based on a notion 
of entitlements that people can claim as citizens and governments need to deliver (Cook 
2009; Köhler et al. 2009; ESCAP 2011). Economic growth will also have to be accompanied 
by an increase in productive formal employment tied to social security and an expanding 
fiscal capacity of governments. 
3.3 Africa 
Social protection is increasingly being recognised by governments in sub-Saharan Africa as 
an important intervention to reduce poverty and vulnerability to recurrent shocks and climate 
change. An estimated one-third of African countries has now developed social protection 
strategies (World Bank 2012b). In particular, the aftermath of the ‘triple F’ crisis in 2008 and 
the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa highlighted the importance of putting in place formal 
safety nets for the most vulnerable people. In 2008 members of the African Union endorsed 
the Social Policy Framework (African Union 2008), which highlights social protection as an 
important element of inclusive growth strategies. 
In comparison to other global regions, the predominant form of social protection in Africa is 
social assistance. Safety nets have a long history, particularly in the context of humanitarian 
response. Some countries, notably Ethiopia, are attempting to shift away from reactive 
appeals for emergency food aid towards institutionalised ‘productive safety nets’ that provide 
protection against drought shocks when required but also livelihood support with the ambition 
of ‘graduating’ food-insecure rural populations into resilient and sustainable livelihoods. 
There is still a high degree of fragmentation of transfer programmes, which tend to be small-
scale and mainly donor-funded. The World Bank (2012b) estimates that there were 123 cash 
transfer programmes in 34 African countries in 2010, but only 20 per cent of Africans benefit 
from some type of publicly provided social protection. 
A number of countries have initiated efforts to reform their pension systems to expand 
coverage and consolidate different schemes, such as Cape Verde, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Zambia. The high proportion of informal workers poses challenges to extending social 
security to the most vulnerable people, but countries such as Ghana are introducing 
innovative schemes where self-employed citizens can voluntarily contribute into a pension 
scheme. Insurance markets are also growing in the region, particularly for life, agriculture 
and health insurance, but their scale and success vary. 
In order to harness labour market programmes more labour-intensive economic growth is 
needed, that increases productivity and generates better paying jobs. There is a long history 
of public works programmes in Africa, with rural people being paid in food or cash to build or 
maintain community infrastructure. However, these are not permanent jobs, they are not 
linked to social security schemes and they rarely transfer skills that can equip public works 
participants to find well-paid employment in the formal labour market (McCord 2013). 
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As in all regions, there are context-specific characteristics that make generalisations across 
countries difficult. Nonetheless, there have been attempts to distinguish between two types 
of models, mainly based on the level of economic development in the countries. Middle-
income countries, notably in southern Africa, have a longer history with a broader range and 
deeper coverage of social protection, including well-developed formal social insurance 
schemes, as well as labour market and employment interventions. Low-income countries and 
fragile states are more constrained in their financial and institutional capacity, yet have 
greater numbers of people in need of social protection. Apart from different levels of 
economic development, some argue that there are fundamental differences in the policy 
processes and selection of social protection interventions between LICs and MICs in Africa. 
As Niño-Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hulme and Hickey (2012) argue, MIC governments have 
focused more on developing social transfers that target age-based vulnerability, such as the 
Old Age Grant and Child Support Grant in South Africa, which are rights-based (underpinned 
by legislation) and tax-funded. 
In LICs, by contrast, development partners (donor agencies, multilateral financial institutions 
and international NGOs) have played a strong role in advocating for social protection. As a 
result, many social transfers in these countries take the form of pilot projects that are 
externally funded and have a limited degree of institutionalisation and political commitment at 
national level. It has been questioned whether the current rise of social protection in the 
region is due to the strong influence of external actors and whether it will wane as donor 
fashions change, or will the social protection agenda be fully taken on by African 
governments? The sustainability of social protection systems in the region hinges on national 
ownership, and more thinking needs to be put into how donors can support and engage with 
domestic policy processes (Cherrier 2014; de Haan 2014). 
Figure 3.2 highlights the extremely low coverage of social protection programmes in Africa 
(and, to a lesser extent, in South Asia), relative to other regions. Social protection might be 
on the rise in Africa, but it still has a very long way to go. 
Figure 3.2 Coverage of social protection and labour market programmes, 
by region 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2012b: 23). 
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4 Drivers of change 
Drivers of change are factors that are considered likely to shape the world in the next ten to 
15 years and thereby the landscape that social protection operates in, determining the 
trajectory and shape of social protection in the future. Following the Foresight methodology 
(see Annex 2), drivers of change were considered in five possible categories, namely Social, 
Technological, Economic, Environmental, and Political (STEEP). These drivers of change 
were assessed using all methods in this project. Findings from the literature review point 
more towards historical drivers of the current state of social protection, while findings from 
the key informant interviews, online discussion and Foresight workshops are more forward 
looking and consider drivers that are deemed important and likely to play an important role in 
the shaping the future world in which social protection will operate. 
4.1 Social 
A number of social factors emerged across all different methods of investigation in this 
project. Key issues that are considered to play an important role in shaping the future social 
protection landscape include increasing inequality, demographic shifts, and urbanisation and 
rural-urban migration. 
Rising inequality has incentivised several governments, particularly in middle-income 
countries, to introduce social protection as a redistributive mechanism that has the potential 
to reduce inequality. The frequent mention of inequality as a driver of social protection also 
implies that it is considered an important intervention for addressing needs of particularly 
vulnerable groups that are moving up the development policy agenda, such as people with 
disabilities and adolescent girls. Various key informants pointed towards the potentially 
dangerous social impacts of inequality and the role for social protection as a palliative 
mechanism: 
Social inequality and exclusion are simmering under the surface. This might increase 
the demand-side of social protection or other programmes emphasising equity. Also, 
governments may see a role for social protection in preventing social discontent and 
start looking at social protection to prevent civil unrest. 
(Jennifer Yablonski) 
Indeed, social protection can be an attractive policy instrument in contexts where 
governments aim to reduce income inequality and enhance social cohesion. In contexts with 
high levels of income inequality, social protection is more affordable since there is usually a 
larger tax-base to finance it with domestic resources (Hickey 2008), while in contexts with 
high levels of social inequality (as in many countries of North Africa and the Middle East) the 
associated political volatility has triggered increased investment in social protection. So 
income and social inequalities have consequences on both the supply- and demand-side. 
Demographic shifts will transform the composition of societies. Some countries will be 
confronted with a ‘population dividend’ provided by a large percentage of young people, 
while others are already foreseeing an increasing need for pensions due to a growing 
proportion of older people. Will a higher demand for social protection for particular groups of 
society translate into more and better-quality supply? During the online discussion, some 
thought that the key question is ‘whether population ageing stimulates the expansion of 
social protection – and especially pensions – or will ultimately lead to its unaffordability (or 
both)’. 
Certainly not all discussion participants and key informants agreed that demographic shifts 
will determine the course of social protection: 
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I think there is an ‘over-talk’ of demography. These are the underlying conditions that 
you have to react to, but whether the system actually reacts to them depends on the 
political will. The system demographics are not forcing change to the extent that we 
would think. 
(Michael Cichon) 
Higher levels of urbanisation also increase the need for social protection since rural-urban 
migration often leads to a disruption or disintegration of traditional (rural) safety nets. Social 
protection has traditionally focused on the rural poor and has developed instruments which 
address particular vulnerability profiles. A few key informants indeed indicated that this issue 
is not yet given due attention: ‘Urbanisation will become a big issue; it is currently still 
undervalued. Most systems have been set up in rural settings. Much of this can be translated 
into urban settings but it will need to be adapted’ (Nicholas Freeland). However, the types of 
vulnerabilities change when people move from rural to urban areas, as increasing numbers 
of poor people are doing. The loss of traditional safety nets and social capital, and the 
transition from rural livelihoods to mostly informal paid work will change the type of risks 
people are exposed to. 
Urbanisation not only increases the need for formal social protection to reduce vulnerability 
among the labour force, but also increases the demand for social protection by ‘urban 
citizens’ who are more likely to mobilise and lobby for their rights. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012) 
argue that in Southern Africa the higher levels of urbanisation in MICs have played a role in 
determining the socialisation of formal social protection, in comparison to LICs. Labour 
market structures in urban areas are still characterised by high levels of informality, mobile 
workers and gaps in the provision of social security for the poorest. This does not only affect 
migrants from rural areas but also international migrants, particularly as eligibility for social 
protection is often tied to citizenship status. This gives rise to the question of how social 
protection will have to change to fill these gaps and address the new sets of emerging 
vulnerabilities. 
Further social drivers of change that were identified in the Foresight workshops include 
changing social relations within families and communities, changing societal expectations 
around demand for social protection, changing ideologies and ideas of solidarity. 
4.2 Technological 
Technological factors were not considered to be greatly important in shaping the future 
landscape for social protection. Technology was mostly considered as an aspect of delivery 
of social protection programmes. Rapidly spreading information technology like mobile 
phones, GPS identification and cheap data processing can help countries to leapfrog to 
flexible and effective service delivery and system integration mechanisms (World Bank 
2012a). Technology was not considered by our key informants to greatly change the demand 
for social protection: 
Not significant. Important for implementation and effectiveness, but I don’t think there 
will be a big technological breakthrough tomorrow that will make a massive difference 
to relinquish social assistance problems in developing countries. 
(Armando Barrientos) 
Technology won’t change the shape of the system, but how it is administered. 
(Michael Cichon) 
Two additional technological factors were considered in the Foresight workshops. Firstly, the 
role of technology in changing skills requirements in labour markets, shifting demand for 
labour even further towards high-skilled and away from low-skilled labour. This trend may 
have implications for the demand for social protection, particularly for low-skilled workers. 
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Secondly, the role of social media and its rapid increase in the use of advanced technology 
may allow for greater civil society mobilisation and organisation, thereby generating greater 
demand for social protection. 
4.3 Economic 
In terms of economic factors, issues regarding economic growth and economic volatility were 
discussed in the online discussion and key informant interviews. 
High levels of economic growth in many developing countries and the reclassification of 
low-income as middle-income countries, gave rise to the question whether social protection 
will expand as a result: 
In developing countries, as they become better off as incomes grow, as middle 
classes and upper-middle classes begin to expand, it will be interesting to see 
whether or not that will increase the demand for social protection, as in countries 
wanting to provide safety nets for their poor rather than being externally funded. 
(John Hoddinott) 
A strong focus on economic growth as a development objective is also increasing the 
pressure on social protection to demonstrate positive impacts on reducing inequality, 
increasing the productivity of the poor and contributing to economic growth (World Bank 
2012a). This could on the one hand increase political support for social protection, but could 
also divert attention from its main objective – to protect people against risks and reduce 
vulnerability (de Haan 2014). Various key informants emphasised the importance of 
reconciling the objectives of economic growth and reducing inequality and the role of social 
protection in such ‘inclusive economic growth’: ‘Inclusive growth agenda and inequality: 
bringing them together will be a key factor for social protection’ (Nicola Hypher). 
Recent financial crises and economic volatility were referred to many times as suggesting a 
greater need for social protection. The financial crisis in 1997–98 in Southeast Asia acted as 
a wake-up call regarding the inadequacy of existing social safety nets and proved an 
important milestone in the region’s development of social protection (Cook 2009). 
Nonetheless, it was pointed out that recent crises have not yet raised enough awareness 
about the need for social protection: 
If the triple-dip comes, if we have another impact of the financial crisis, this could lead 
back to more discussions on social protection. But somehow, inexplicably, the 
financial markets’ turbulences and crises don’t seem to rock the boat as we expected 
it [sic] would, such as the crisis in Argentina. 
(Gabriele Köhler) 
Further economic factors identified in the Foresight workshops include the changing levels 
and characteristics of poverty, increasing flexibilisation of labour markets and shifts in private 
versus public service provision, including a potential for more public-private partnerships in 
the delivery of social protection. 
4.4 Environmental 
Environmental drivers of change were identified in relation to issues of climate change and 
revenue from natural resources. Poor people in rural areas, whose livelihoods depend on 
natural resources, are particularly likely to be impacted negatively by changes in the natural 
environment. 
The consequences of climate change, including recurring disasters, as well as the 
unpredictability of the weather and consequently agricultural productivity, are increasing the 
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need for social protection to mitigate livelihood risks (ESCAP 2011; UNICEF 2012). Many 
online discussants and key informants pointed towards the role of social protection in making 
people more resilient to climate shocks by supporting them to adapt their livelihoods: 
Climate change will play a big role. It will require adaptation and changes of 
livelihoods. People will have to take the risks of transforming livelihoods and most 
people have little tolerance for these changes since it is too risky. Governments need 
to promise social protection or minimum standard of living. If so, then poor people will 
be able to take more risks and adapt. 
(Timo Voipio) 
Notwithstanding the importance that climate change will play in shaping the world in ten to 15 
years’ time, not everyone agreed that this would be an important issue for social protection to 
engage with: ‘It’s not fundamental, it’s mainly a buzz-word’ (Anna McCord) and ‘There are 
better mechanisms to address that [climate change] than social protection’ (Arjan de Haan). 
Clearly, this is an area where opinion is sharply divided, with one view being that climate 
change will continue to rise up the agenda and that social protection offers an appropriate 
response, and an opposing view being that social protection has only a marginal role to play 
in addressing the fundamental challenges to livelihoods that climate change poses. 
In terms of natural resources, there was also discussion regarding the extent to which 
revenue from natural resources can help finance social protection: 
There is a natural resource revenue point, and an ongoing debate on whether you 
can use natural resources directly to fund cash transfers, for example, or whether that 
is subverting government assistance. Whether that is a good or a bad thing, that 
debate is going to continue to run, I am sure. 
(Matthew Greenslade) 
4.5 Political 
Political drivers were considered crucial in shaping the future world that social protection will 
be part of and to which it will need to respond. These drivers were identified as operating at 
different levels and include global development paradigms, political realities in donor 
countries and political commitment at national level. 
Inequality is widely seen as a major force that could drive a rationale for social protection and 
create a political incentive within the global development paradigm. Reducing inequality – 
encompassing income inequality and inequalities along socio-demographic characteristics – 
is also a ‘hot topic’ in current development debates, and social protection is often mentioned 
as one of the main policy instruments to achieve this. One of the authors, contributing to the 
online discussion, wrote: ‘Whether driven by genuine altruism, enlightened self-interest or 
political opportunism, social protection will continue to expand as long as intolerable gaps in 
wealth and wellbeing persist between the rich and the rest.’ 
How this will happen is still unclear and it could go in different directions: ‘Will growing 
inequalities cause greater social schisms and the development of parallel systems 
(comfortable social security for the better off, and meagre poor relief for the poor), or will they 
fuel demands for more universal and redistributive social protection systems?’ At the regional 
level in Africa, for example, the African Progress Panel and the African Development Bank 
are emphasising the need for governments to step up their investments in health, education 
and social protection, with a view to moving towards universal access to these basic social 
services. Consolidating regional integration and harmonising social security will help to 
address challenges posed to social security systems, for example by migrant workers. 
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This leads into a second political driver, namely the political reality in donor countries, or 
influential countries that have a strong impact on policy in developing countries. ‘Chindia’ 
was coined as a term during the Foresight workshops to denote the expanding and 
increasingly important role of China and India in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing 
countries. Whether the political climate in countries that are driving social protection as a 
global development policy agenda is ‘progressive’ (rights-based) or ‘regressive’ (austerity-
driven), has profound implications for levels of financing and the nature of technical support 
offered. While progressive agendas may be supportive of more universal and redistributive 
systems that are embedded in legal frameworks, regressive policies are more likely to focus 
on maintaining the status quo and providing only discretionary support to those in absolute 
need. 
While international agreements, UN conventions and donor agendas can put social 
protection into the limelight and provide the tools to think about establishing social protection 
systems, whether this translates into action will ultimately depend on political commitment 
at the national level. What determines such political commitment will be context-specific. 
Democratic processes and the ability of society to organise itself and influence welfare 
policies are thought to be essential: ‘Democracy is and will be one of the key drivers. 
Expansion of social protection towards universal comprehensive systems depends in the end 
on how much organised society and voters wish to see it.’ At the same time, countries such 
as Ethiopia, Rwanda, China and Vietnam may not fit such a characterisation of their political 
contexts but have seen strong commitment to and expansion of social protection. National 
ownership of social protection programmes is emerging unanimously as a necessary pre-
condition for the sustainability of programmes, and forms a strong pillar of social protection 
strategies: ‘It will be crucial to raise the political profile of social protection at the national 
level. In countries with high levels of political buy-in progress is much faster’ (Nicholas 
Freeland). 
Yet, how and why governments decide on committing to social protection is highly context-
specific. Frequently, the popularity of social protection is explained along social-democratic 
(or Polanyian) lines – growing inequalities and vulnerabilities trigger expansions of public 
policies. There is, however, no direct causality between increasing needs (demand) and 
increasing delivery of social protection (supply), since it leaves the political drivers of social 
policies out of the equation (de Haan 2014). Public and political opinions on social 
provisioning and the role of the state are deeply ideologically motivated. 
In some regions, political commitment will derive from a determination to uphold the rights of 
their citizens. Nevertheless, they will also be strongly influenced by immediate political 
pressures, particularly in electoral democracies, or by longer-term considerations if social 
stability is seen as critical to political legitimacy (ESCAP 2011; Cecchini and Martínez 2012). 
In other contexts where social protection is externally financed, policy processes and sources 
of financing are still detached. Evidence is built around ‘what works’ rather than on what kind 
of evidence will be credible and useful to influence national policy processes (Devereux and 
White 2010; Gentilini and Omamo 2011). 
Indeed, some key informants pointed towards the importance of championing social 
protection and showcasing positive effects: 
There will always be opponents to social protection and champions. And this is not 
going to change, but the overall opinion could move into the favour of champions, as 
time passes and people will see how social protection can work at scale and have 
positive impacts on poverty reduction. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, cash 
transfers are still new, and things are still evolving. It will be important to share 
experiences across countries and also with regions like Latin America on how it 
works. 
(Matthew Greenslade) 
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This ties into a final driver that was discussed extensively during the Foresight workshops, 
namely that of institutional capacity. In other words, what level of financial, human and 
technical resources do countries have (or are willing to dedicate) for social protection 
programmes, and do they have institutions strong enough to deliver them effectively? 
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5 Future issues and debates 
In its initial phase in the early 2000s, when social protection was being introduced to low-
income countries, most of the issues that generated debate were conceptual and technical, 
and were often expressed as polarities or choices between alternative approaches. 
Conceptual questions included: Is social protection about managing risk and vulnerability or 
reducing poverty? Is social protection only for the poor or is it for everyone? Should social 
protection be needs-based or rights-based? Technical debates revolved around design and 
implementation aspects: cash transfers or food aid? Conditional or unconditional transfers? 
Targeting or universal provision?1 
The past ten years have seen a proliferation of efforts to find answers to these questions, 
partly by experimentation – pilot projects using different targeting mechanisms, or applying 
conditionalities to some beneficiaries but not others; and by building the evidence base – 
rigorous impact evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of social protection in achieving 
various objectives in relation to poverty, food security, access to education and health 
services, women’s empowerment, and so on.2 
Few clear answers have been found, often because there are no ‘right or wrong’ answers: 
choices need to be made involving trade-offs, e.g. between targeting costs and targeting 
accuracy. Nonetheless, most of these debates have been more or less resolved. We now 
know under which conditions cash transfers are more effective than food aid, for instance, 
and that whether to apply conditionalities is an ideological choice rather than a technical 
decision. As a consequence, the main issues and debates in the social protection arena 
during the next ten to 15 years are likely to be very different. 
Among the many issues that were raised during the course of this project, the following five 
stand out as likely to dominate social protection thinking and practice in the years ahead: 
building national systems, fiscal affordability, understanding political processes, labour 
market linkages, and coverage. 
5.1 Building national systems 
International organisations as well as academics are now putting the need for national 
systems-building at the centre of future social protection development. There is a broad 
consensus on the imperative to move away from the fragmented approaches of short-term 
pilot projects and lack of coordination across government entities between national social 
assistance and social insurance schemes, towards a harmonised and more efficient system. 
International actors also acknowledge that efforts to harmonise social protection should apply 
not only to governments, but also to development partners. Better coordination and 
coherence of international actors is considered vital to assist national governments to set up 
efficient and effective systems that address the underlying causes of vulnerability (ESCAP 
2011: 45; ILO 2014; UNICEF 2012: 20; World Bank 2012b). 
Several governments are pursuing systemic approaches to social protection or social policies 
through national strategies. However, this varies significantly across regions and countries, 
being more prevalent among middle-income countries of Latin America and parts of Asia 
than low-income countries in Africa. Some countries are resistant to endorsing systemic 
approaches, particularly where low financial and institutional capacity poses obstacles to 
introducing systems, or where ideology and political interests oppose universal access to 
social protection due to fears of dependency (Cherrier 2014: 16; Andrews et al. 2012: 37). 
                                               
1 Arguments for and against these issues were made in an IDS Bulletin titled ‘Debating Social Protection’ (Devereux and 
Sabates-Wheeler 2007). 
2 For overviews of the evidence base, see DFID (2011); Alderman and Yemtsov (2012); Barrientos (2013). 
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One key informant questioned whether the focus on building systems is more of a donor-
driven agenda than a priority at national level. 
Donors talk about systems, but I am not sure that national governments do so much. 
Systems are far too ambitious for many countries. Most of the development around 
social protection has happened around flagship programmes – like PSNP in Ethiopia, 
Bolsa Familía in Brazil, or the Child Support Grant in South Africa – and not around 
systems. 
(Armando Barrientos) 
5.2 Fiscal affordability 
Debates around the need for comprehensive, nationally owned social protection systems 
lead logically to the question of financial affordability and sustainability. Economic growth in 
many LICs and MICs is generating fiscal space that could be harnessed for establishing and 
maintaining social protection systems. Where there is growth and fiscal space, the allocation 
of resources becomes a question of political priorities as well as of increasing domestic 
revenue-generating capacity through efficient, effective and progressive tax systems 
(Cecchini and Martínez 2012; European Commission 2012). It does not inevitably follow that 
an increasing capacity to finance social protection will lead to rising allocations of the national 
budget. 
In Africa, assuming that economic growth will continue, the question is financing and 
how state revenues can pay for social protection – so moving more from external 
funding to national funding. Countries will have to assess how high a priority social 
protection will play in comparison to other interventions, and each country will answer 
this differently depending on their political economy. 
(Arjan de Haan) 
A challenge for financial sustainability, particularly in LICs, lies in the fact that there is a large 
population in need of social protection, and a relatively small group of the population that is 
better off and paying tax. Creating a social contract and recognition of social protection as an 
entitlement, will be crucial to build public support for tax-funded programmes (Cherrier 2014). 
A fear of creating dependency in contexts with limited public resources has created 
resistance among elites to expand social assistance (Kabeer et al. 2010). 
However, in contexts with very low rates of economic growth and political instability, 
redistribution of public resources becomes a challenge, which leads to a ‘chicken-and-egg’ 
question: which should be prioritised first – economic growth or redistribution? (Gentilini and 
Omamo 2011). Financing of social protection thus relates to the pursuit of economic growth 
models that promote inclusiveness through redistribution of resources and the generation of 
employment with increasing access to formal social security (ADB 2013; World Bank 2012a). 
But this has its own risks: 
Will growing inequalities cause greater social schisms and the development of 
parallel systems (comfortable social security for the better off, and meagre poor relief 
for the poor), or will they fuel demands for more universal and redistributive social 
protection systems? 
(Charles Knox-Vydmanov) 
In these contexts it has been argued that development partners will continue to play an 
important role in providing financial support to countries in the initial (and costly) phases of 
setting up systems. However, a contradictory trend is evident between the promotion of 
increasing financing for social protection in LICs, and the fiscal consolidation of public 
expenditure on social protection, particularly in HICs and MICs. The global financial crisis in 
2008 initially led to a boost in global financing for social protection as part of stimulus 
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packages, but this was rolled back in 2010 in a large number of countries – in some cases to 
levels below pre-crisis levels (ILO 2014). According to some, the austerity measures in donor 
countries could be one of the biggest threats to social protection – not only in their own 
countries, but also in countries that depend on external funding (de Haan 2014). One key 
informant noted that ‘developing countries are watching what is happening in Europe now 
and will take this into consideration for building welfare systems in their own countries’. 
5.3 Understanding political processes 
Moving from small-scale projects to large-scale systems requires strong political commitment 
by national governments. This still varies across countries and regions, with stronger national 
leadership in Latin America and MICs in Southern Africa. International actors recognise the 
importance of context-specificity for the formulation of national social protection programmes 
and stress the importance of building national ownership. The academic literature, however, 
has highlighted throughout the past decade that international actors have been paying too 
little attention to local policy processes, and too much attention to technical issues. As noted 
above, building the evidence base has focused on resolving technical questions (such as 
how to target accurately and cost-effectively) and quantifying impacts of social protection, but 
not enough on understanding why social protection is attractive to some governments more 
than others. In countries with high levels of donor influence this limited understanding of 
policy processes and political incentives has inhibited the ‘nationalisation’ and scale-up of 
donor-driven pilot projects. Understanding political processes better is increasingly 
recognised as an issue that needs to be prioritised in the future (Hickey 2008; Niño-Zarazúa 
et al. 2012; Cherrier 2014; de Haan 2014). 
We need a better understanding of political processes. There is much on this in Latin 
America around this, but very little in Africa or South Asia. This is an important gap. It 
is a challenge: unless you can work out the politics you will not be able to get effective 
programmes on the ground. 
(Armanda Barrientos) 
There was broad agreement among online discussion contributors that the presence or 
absence of democracy and democratic institutions, notably a campaigning civil society, is 
crucial for generating demand for social protection. International agreements, regional 
declarations and UN conventions can put social protection into the forefront of political 
debates – but whether this translates into action will ultimately be decided at the national 
level. One contributor argued that democratic processes and society’s ability to organise 
itself and influence policies will be essential. ‘Democracy is and will be one of the key drivers. 
Expansion of social protection towards universal comprehensive systems depends in the end 
on how much organized society and voters wish to see it.’ 
It follows that understanding political processes is also crucial at the sub-national level. To 
ensure that citizens achieve access to social protection in countries where it is just starting to 
emerge, or to protect their access in places where it is being eroded, grassroots movements 
and local civil society need to be strengthened. Strengthening public accountability for social 
protection requires ‘a shift away from central government advocacy towards including more 
awareness-raising on rights, empowerment of communities, creating functioning case 
management systems and expanding public advocacy’ (Sarah Hague). 
5.4 Labour market linkages 
An emerging feature of the trend towards more systemic approaches to social protection is a 
call for more explicit linkages to labour markets, in at least three ways. On the one hand, 
social protection should be linked to active labour market policies that aim to increase the 
employability and earnings of those who have traditionally been excluded from formal 
employment, e.g. through skills development programmes, thereby promoting the creation of 
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formal jobs that are linked to social insurance (Cecchini and MartÍnez 2012; ILO 2014). This 
is sometimes interpreted as a rights-based agenda. It will require ‘civil society activism and 
effective state intervention that delivers the right to decent work, attached to employment-
related benefits which are guaranteed, enforceable – and enforced’ (Colette Solomon). 
On the other hand, it is necessary to improve the conditions of work by enabling access to 
social security for those in the informal sector. The coverage and scale of social insurance 
varies across countries and regions, but in general coverage is low particularly for those who 
are not working in the urban formal sector. International organisations are promoting the 
extension of social protection, particularly social insurance, to the informal sector and to 
groups who have been excluded from formal insurance mechanisms, and some innovative 
ideas are beginning to emerge (ADB 2013; World Bank 2012a). 
Thirdly, there is growing belief in the power of ‘graduation’ programmes to move people out 
of extreme poverty and food insecurity by delivering an integrated package of support that 
includes consumption support (cash transfers, access to savings) and livelihood support 
(asset transfers and training). Impressive evidence of success from NGO programmes in 
Bangladesh has led to replicas or variants being introduced in several other countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (Hashemi and Umaira 2011). These efforts to move poor 
people out of dependence on social assistance and into self-reliance and resilient livelihoods 
is sometimes interpreted as an innovative approach to poverty reduction, but has also been 
criticised as an attempt by governments to reduce their responsibility for delivering social 
protection to vulnerable citizens. 
5.5 Coverage 
Several international organisations are promoting universal access to social protection as an 
entitlement that citizens should be able to claim (ILO 2011; UNICEF 2012; ESCAP 2011), 
and a range of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have laid the legal foundation for 
the provision of social protection in national legislation or even in their constitutions. While 
there remains an ideological divide between targeted approaches versus rights-based 
universalism, the focus on systems-building is changing the tone of the debate and making a 
case for a more efficient provision of social protection through ‘targeting within universalism’. 
This is not to suggest a move away from designing social protection targeted at specific 
groups, but that targeting should be embedded within a framework of universal coverage of 
social protection, particularly extending it to those who have been excluded (ESCAP 2011: 
54; ILO 2014: 80). A universal approach to social protection also implies improving the 
supply-side of social services, such as health, water and sanitation and education and 
embedding it within a wider social policy framework. 
A more fundamental concern is the continuing low level of coverage of social protection 
across the world, especially in most LICs and many MICs. This is well illustrated by Figure 
3.2 above, which highlights that more than 70 per cent of Africans lack access to any form of 
social protection, notwithstanding the rapid and impressive rise of social protection in the 
development policy discourse. 
When you start concentrating on the technical support and building of systems, 
donors can lose sight of the fact that coverage is still very low. I think there will be an 
important role for the UN and civil society, international NGOs to play in pushing on 
the coverage point. 
(Matthew Greenslade) 
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6 Future scenarios 
This section presents the data generated by the fourth research methodology deployed in 
this project – two ‘Foresight’ workshops that formulated scenarios and identified policy 
options for social protection in each scenario (see Annex 2 for a detailed description of the 
Foresight methodology). 
Two Foresight workshops were held at IDS, in September and November 2014, on the topic: 
Where next for social protection? They entailed a facilitated and collaborative process during 
which (i) key challenges and opportunities for social protection were identified (‘drivers of 
change’); (ii) possible alternative scenarios for the future of social protection were elaborated 
(‘scenario-building’); and (iii) potential social protection policy responses were ‘tested’ against 
each of these scenarios (‘windtunnelling’). The methodology and process encouraged ‘out-
of-the-box’ thinking and working through specific policy options and their feasibility or 
applicability in different situations. 
6.1 Scenario-building 
Following the identification of drivers of change likely to shape the world that social protection 
operates in (a full description of which has been given in section 4), two drivers were 
selected to underpin the ‘scenario-building’ exercise. ‘Progressive/regressive politics’ and 
‘high/low national institutional capacity’ emerged as key drivers along which scenarios 
should be framed. 
These two drivers were subsequently placed on a continuum on an X-axis and Y-axis 
respectively, such that four potential scenarios emerged (corresponding to the quadrants in 
Figure 6.1): 
 ‘Utopia’ (top right): progressive politics, high capacity 
 ‘The spirit is willing but the body is weak’ (bottom right): progressive politics, low 
capacity 
 ‘All dressed up but nowhere to go’ (top right) regressive politics, high capacity 
 ‘Oh dear’ (bottom left): regressive politics, low capacity. 
It was decided that the ‘ideal’ scenario (top right – ‘Utopia’) would not be discussed as it was 
considered to be the least interesting scenario for further exploration, and least likely to occur 
in the low-income countries where social protection is currently being introduced or 
expanded, within the ten- to 15-year timeframe for this analysis. 
In the process of scenario-building, however, it became evident that the driver on ‘politics’ 
was not specific enough and conflated political processes at two different levels: (1) national 
or local level and (2) global or ‘influential countries’ level, where influential countries are 
those dominating the design and financing of social protection programmes in low-income 
countries. Sub-dividing the politics driver to account for this bifurcation resulted in the 
emergence of six scenarios for further exploration (see Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Scenarios 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
To keep the analysis manageable, it was decided to choose one slice – (a) or (b) – of each 
quadrant only. In order to maximise diversity, the following scenarios were chosen for further 
elaboration: 
 Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 
 Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 
 Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
They were elaborated as follows: 
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 
progressive local politics, progressive international politics, low institutional 
capacity 
 In this scenario there exists goodwill and good intentions, both domestically and 
internationally, but limited capacity to deliver social protection and other services 
effectively. Factors that might hold back progress in this scenario include: high or 
rising civil insecurity, food price and climate-related shocks, a youthful population with 
low skills, the dominance of the private sector over societal interests, and rising social 
frustrations about government failures leading to service delivery protests. 
 Positive features of this scenario include: an alignment of national governments and 
donors and development partners around what needs to be done, high aid flows with 
a particular emphasis on strengthening institutional capacity and technical expertise, 
an active civil society which could be strengthened and rights-based policies – at 
least on paper. There is potential for technology to help tackle or bypass delivery 
challenges. 
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 There is a risk of donor dependence or that social experiments will be trialled as pilot 
projects. Social protection initiatives that are launched in this context might be 
unsustainable because they rely heavily on expatriate financial and technical inputs, 
and government lacks the capacity to take over their management and scale them up. 
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 
regressive local politics, progressive international politics, low institutional capacity 
 This scenario is characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality. Citizens have 
no voice and civil society is weak or repressed, so government is effectively 
unaccountable. Civil society exists mainly as implementing partners for development 
projects of international donors, rather than as activists campaigning for change. 
Government has no interest in rights-based approaches, clientelism is rife, public 
provision of services is weak, the middle classes depend on private social services, 
and there is low commitment by public officials to help the poor. 
 Apart from the dire political situation, the economic situation is equally challenging. 
Labour markets are insecure with a large informal sector and unregulated markets; 
there is little social protection against livelihood shocks such as extreme weather 
events, price shocks and financial crises; people face multiple vulnerabilities, such as 
high health risks and low health outcomes. 
 Because of these political and economic challenges, there is extensive ‘economic’ 
migration within and between countries, including unplanned and poorly serviced 
urban informal settlement, as well as ‘political’ migration inside and beyond national 
boundaries (population displacement, refugees). International actors have a limited 
role, which is often restricted to humanitarian relief. 
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
regressive local politics, regressive international politics, high institutional capacity 
 Because politics in this scenario are regressive both locally and internationally, 
external relations are dominated by ‘trade, not aid’ – international trade agreements 
rather than aid flows. The labour market is stagnant and unemployment is high. There 
is inadequate state regulation of private sector employers. This is a low-wage 
economy dominated by informalisation. Societal expectations and ambitions are low. 
Those who can, migrate to more vibrant economies in more progressive countries 
elsewhere. 
 Because local capacity is relatively high, financing for social protection is generated 
by economic growth and a mix of public and private provision. However, only a 
minimal safety net is installed, to quell social unrest. Public expenditure is rolled back 
and public sector budgets are cut for ideological reasons. Social insurance is based 
on private contributions while social assistance comes with conditionalities attached. 
This leads to rising inequality and polarisation, with limited redistribution of public 
resources and few groups being adequately covered by government-run social 
protection programmes. 
Perhaps the most useful insight to emerge from this scenario-building exercise was the 
recognition that future trajectories for social protection depend on factors beyond the control 
of people who are advocating or designing or administering social protection programmes, 
and that these factors are not generalisable but are highly context-specific and subject to 
change over time. There is no single linear pathway for social protection going forward, but a 
number of pathways that will move in complex ways as political ideologies shift both 
domestically and in the global development discourse and as institutional capacities grow 
steadily over time, or are undermined by conflict and insecurity. 
33 
6.2 Windtunnelling 
The windtunnelling exercise aimed to formulate policy options for social protection within 
these three scenarios. The focus was on identifying viable and feasible options in the three 
different ‘future worlds’. Policy options formulated for one scenario were subsequently 
‘tested’ against the other scenarios to assess their feasibility and opportunities for application 
in radically different contexts. Discussions on the basis of this exercise are summarised here, 
while the data generated in the workshop are presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 below. 
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 
 Proposed policy options included: building consensus on a single national vision and 
platform for social protection; using technical assistance in innovative ways to 
strengthen local capacity; signing up to the Social Protection Floor and adopting a 
‘progressive realisation’ approach to achieving it, increasing public demand for social 
services, including accountability mechanisms such as grievance procedures, and 
introducing right-to-work schemes (employment guarantees rather than public works 
projects). All of these proposals were agreed to be appropriate in a context of 
progressive local and international political regimes but low institutional capacity. 
 These proposals received mixed reactions from scenarios 2a and 3b. There was little 
enthusiasm for a national vision and no interest at all in signing up to the Social 
Protection Floor, which was dismissed as ‘too progressive’. Public services would be 
delivered alongside private providers and there would definitely be no accountability 
mechanisms. The ‘right-to-work’ proposal was rejected in favour of old-style public 
works: ‘No right to work, but duty to work’. 
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 
 Proposed policy options were very limited and unambitious, reflecting the limited 
commitment and accountability of this regressive regime and its low capacity to 
deliver public services. Social protection would effectively take its most basic ‘safety 
net’ forms: humanitarian response during crises (probably delivered by international 
agencies rather than the government), public works projects (also externally funded 
and run by donors or NGOs), mother and child feeding schemes, and contributory 
pensions for civil servants as part of the government’s clientelist orientation. 
 The regressive government of scenario 3b endorsed these suggestions, as both 
regimes share a common ideology. But since scenario 3b has higher capacity to 
deliver services, the government would be the main implementing agency for all 
interventions. The progressive government of scenario 1a did not oppose these ideas 
in principle, but would implement them as part of a coordinated national vision for 
social protection rather than as isolated projects. Contributory pensions for civil 
servants would only be acceptable as one component of a universal pension scheme. 
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
 Policy options in this scenario were highly regressive. The regime is assumed to be 
pro-business so deregulation of business is favoured, implying low social security 
coverage and contributions, and no minimum wage to protect low-paid workers 
against exploitation. Social protection will be dominated by conditionalities and a 
focus on graduating people off programmes and into the labour market as quickly as 
possible. Minimal social assistance will take the form of food banks that will be run by 
non-profit 3rd sector plus private partnerships. 
 The equally regressive government of scenario 2a supported these proposals in 
principle, but noted that international donor partners might not endorse excessive 
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deregulation of the private sector and restricted social security protections for 
workers. They might also lack the capacity to implement graduation programmes, 
even while agreeing with the intention behind them. The government of scenario 1a 
disapproved of this entire set of proposals on ideological grounds. Favouring 
business, conditionalities, graduation, and soup kitchens are all antithetical to the 
more pro-poor and rights-based orientation of this progressive regime and its 
progressive international partners. 
This exercise revealed that the fundamental determinant of a country’s social protection 
trajectory is likely to be the nature of that country’s political regime. A progressive 
government will be open to rights-based approaches such as the Social Protection Floor and 
employment guarantee schemes, civil society mobilisation and accountability mechanisms. 
Low institutional capacity can be partly rectified with the support of development partners, 
especially if the international political climate is also progressive. Conversely, regressive 
governments will reject rights-based approaches in favour of minimalist safety net 
approaches such as food banks, public works projects and limited conditional cash transfers. 
The economic and political contexts will be conducive to business and the private sector, and 
contributory social security for formal employees is preferred to large-scale social assistance 
programmes such as social grants. The exercise further revealed that the role of the 
international political regime is likely to be limited. While it may be important in creating an 
enabling environment for progressive and innovative policy design (through the launch of 
global initiatives such as the Social Protection Floor and provision of technical assistance, for 
example) or acting as a brake on regressive interventions, it is unlikely to form a decisive 
factor in shaping national social protection landscapes. 
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Table 6.1 Windtunnelling results: Policy options for scenario 1a 
Scenarios 
 
 
Policy options 
1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
progressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics, 
regressive international politics, 
high institutional capacity 
Single national vision and platform for social 
protection (operational, pie on the ground/pie in the 
hand, not just pie in the sky) – capacity-building: new 
models for technical assistance (TA) by development 
partners 
+ + +/- 
(May be possible, but even if a 
regressive regime would have 
aim for a national vision, but it 
would be very limited and 
restricted.) 
+/- 
(There is a national vision, but no 
pie. We have capacity, but don’t 
want to provide a pie.) 
Sign up to Social Protection Floor (income security to 
all vulnerable groups) – measures put in place 
incrementally, try to use mobile phone technology to 
start cash transfers in most deprived geographical 
areas 
+ + – – 
(It would be too progressive for 
this regressive regime.) 
– – 
(Don’t support Social Protection 
Floor.) 
Build public demand for services – TA, analytical 
work. In terms of policies, there would be grievance 
mechanisms for public programmes, to increase 
accountability (incl. social protection) since it is a key 
issue in a low capacity setting 
+ + – 
(Could be positively dangerous in 
this environment, too many 
grievances.) 
+ 
(There would be competition of 
different delivery mechanisms of 
private providers. But no 
accountability mechanisms.) 
Right-to-work schemes – invite applications! 
(working-age population) – stick to the broad model 
of public works, but be more imaginative in terms of 
the nature of the work done. E.g. encourage orgs to 
apply for funding for a particular project, could be 
more market-oriented or livelihoods-oriented. Public 
works sector is badly in need of new thinking 
+ + + 
(Some kind of public works 
programmes would work.) 
+ 
(No right to work, but duty to 
work.) 
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Table 6.2 Windtunnelling results: Policy options for scenario 2a 
Scenarios 
 
 
Policy options 
1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
progressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics,  
regressive international politics, 
high institutional capacity 
Humanitarian response to shocks, mainly through 
(international) NGOs: food > education 
+ 
(Ideally it would be part of the 
national vision.) 
+ + + 
(Yes, but the implementing actor 
would be government.) 
Public works programmes funded and run by donors 
and NGOs (at lowest common denominator to avoid 
internal conflict and opposition) 
– 
(These would be isolated, 
fragmented projects and oppose 
our national vision of Social 
Protection of a unified approach.) 
+ + + 
(Implementing actor would be 
government.) 
Child/mother feeding programmes by (I)NGOs/ 
government, as part of a minimalist view of social 
protection 
+ 
(Yes, but shouldn’t be the only 
thing.) 
+ + + 
(Implementing actor would be 
government.) 
Contributory pensions for civil servants (government-
run programmes for government, high clientelism) 
+/- 
(Would be part of a vision, but if 
is the only part of pension then it 
is regressive. Has to be part of a 
universal pension scheme.) 
+ + + + 
(Yes, but no other pensions. No 
universal scheme.) 
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Table 6.3 Windtunnelling results: Policy options for scenario 3b 
Scenarios 
 
 
Policy options 
1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ 2a: ‘Oh dear’ 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ 
progressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, 
low institutional capacity 
regressive local politics, 
regressive international politics, 
high institutional capacity 
Deregulation of business (lower contributions to 
social security to lower cost of labour) – more pro-
business, lower contributions to social security, no 
minimum wage 
– 
(Could be positive – some 
deregulation.) 
+/- 
(Local governments might like it, 
but international donors would 
push against this.) 
+ + 
Tighter conditionalities (‘compulsory’ internships to 
continue to receive benefits) – stronger focus on 
increasing productivity, short-term graduation, 
pushing people into the labour market 
– – 
(Don’t support it, would be on the 
basis of cost efficiency, sacrifice 
people’s lives.) 
– 
(Fits the regressive local policies, 
but lack of capacity doesn’t allow 
for enforcing them.) 
+ + 
Food banks (3rd sector + private partnerships) – 
minimal safety net for poorest, hand-out politics, non-
profit private partnerships 
– 
(Not if it’s the only thing.) 
+ 
(Could be a nice, easy bit of 
‘window-dressing’.) 
+ + 
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7 Conclusion 
As noted earlier, this is not a conventional study that investigated a research question or 
hypothesis in order to draw out recommendations for improved practice from the empirical 
findings. Instead we used a variety of methods and tools to draw out a range of views on 
possible future trajectories for social protection as a policy domain in low-income and middle-
income countries, and we have presented these views without imposing our own prejudices 
or a false consensus where none exists. 
At the start of the online discussion event for this project, registered participants were asked 
to vote on whether they believe that social protection will grow, stabilise or decline in the next 
five to ten years. Responses were overwhelmingly optimistic. No less than 87 per cent (63 of 
72 who answered) predicted that social protection will continue to grow, 10 per cent (7 out of 
72) thought it will stabilise at its current level, and only 3 per cent (2 out of 72) believed that it 
will start to decline from its present position on the development policy agenda. 
Figure 7.1 Results of vote on the future of social protection 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Key informants interviewed for this project expressed a diversity of views on this question. 
Many shared the dominant view that social protection will continue to rise on national policy 
agendas. 
People will not tolerate the rising inequalities. Governments will have to find credible 
ways to show they care for their people. Social protection is an effective and 
transparent way to reduce inequalities. Some governments will use it to buy votes, 
and why not? But more and more governments realise that social protection also 
boosts aggregate demand, inclusion and social mobility – without which sustainable 
economic growth will not be feasible. 
(Timo Voipio) 
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Others predicted that social protection will reach a natural plateau fairly soon. 
I would say that the most likely scenario is that social protection will stay about the 
same. The second most likely is that it will increase and the least likely is that it will 
decline. This is due to a proven success of social protection in many countries and it 
has now become part of the development mainstream. There was a big expansion in 
the past so I think it will plateau eventually, once all the programmes are set up. 
(John Hoddinott) 
A few key informants reflected the minority view that social protection will decline, especially 
at the level of the global development policy discourse. 
I think at the global level social protection will become less prominent. It already 
reached its peak with the ILO Declaration in 2012 and it will fizzle out now. In the past 
there was a lot of tension around targeted safety nets versus universalism, conditional 
versus unconditional, but now you can see that the World Bank is going back to 
simple safety nets. The SDGs stress that social protection should be only for the most 
marginalised. We are losing the transformative element of social protection. So at the 
global level there will be a decline, but individual countries will continue building social 
protection systems. 
(Gabriele Köhler) 
Reinforcing the pre-discussion vote, the dominant view among the online participants, as well 
as key informants, was that social protection will continue to become more prominent on the 
development agenda in the next five to ten years, for both ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ 
reasons. 
On the demand side, social protection will grow because there will be a continual increasing 
need for it. Social protection can help in bridging inequality and reducing vulnerability. It can 
function as a stabilising force post-crisis (economic and political) and address social 
exclusion of the poorest. However, the increasing need for social protection should not be 
taken as a sign of its success, if it is used instrumentally as a ‘band-aid’ for failed economic 
strategies and systemic failure. As one discussant stated: 
Unless systemic problems in the labour market are resolved, there will be a growing 
need for even more inclusive and comprehensive social protection [in South Africa] to 
reduce vulnerability, poverty and inequality. In this context, the social safety net will 
inevitably continue to expand but this is more an indicator of a failed economic 
strategy (a failure to generate secure, full-time, well-paid employment) than a 
successful social protection policy. 
(Colette Solomon) 
On the supply side, social protection is increasingly gaining political support. The demand will 
be met because there is increasing political interest in supplying social protection. The last 
decade has seen an exponential growth in the number of developing countries that are 
introducing social protection programmes. Countries like Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, 
or Rwanda and Ethiopia in Africa, have pioneered national social protection programmes that 
have served as models for their regions. Some countries, such as South Africa and India, 
have even integrated legal provisions for social protection into their constitutions. This trend 
will not only continue, but it will likely move towards a more holistic agenda linked to the 
provision of basic services, such as health and education, as well as to economic sectors 
such as agriculture and job creation. Political will and national ownership remain decisive in 
the evolution of national social protection programmes and systems. 
It is never easy to predict the future, but a few projections can be made with some degree of 
confidence. 
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Social protection will continue to consolidate, especially in middle-income countries, where 
projects and programmes will increasingly become components of integrated systems with 
linkages to other social and economic sectors and (where appropriate) harmonised financial 
and technical support from development partners. Challenges of affordability and extending 
coverage will persist in low-income countries – there might even be reversals in unfavourable 
economic and political contexts. 
Economic shocks and political crises, whether at national, regional or global level, will 
continue to either undermine the deepening of social protection systems or will motivate 
increasing investments in building systems to protect people against the consequences of 
these shocks – this could go either way. Social protection will increasingly become a 
response to income inequality and social inequities rather than being driven only by poverty 
and demographic vulnerabilities. It is not yet clear whether rights-based approaches towards 
universal provision underpinned by justiciable legislation, such as the Social Protection Floor, 
will gain traction globally or only in certain countries. 
The governance of social protection will gain increasing attention, particularly with respect to 
such issues as decentralised programming, the role of civil society, and bottom-up social 
accountability mechanisms. Development partners will need to redefine their role, probably 
moving away from financing social protection projects directly and building the evidence base 
on impacts, towards innovative approaches to technical support and building national 
capacities. 
Ultimately, the direction that social protection takes will vary from country to country and will 
shift over time, as capacities to deliver fluctuate and as governments and political ideologies 
change. Better understanding of political processes around social protection, and innovative 
approaches to building institutional capacity, are essential to consolidate progress and to 
exploit both ‘progressive’ periods and times of austerity as windows of opportunity for 
reshaping social protection, as it moves forward into its next phase. 
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Annex 1 Questionnaire for key informant 
interviews 
1. Do you think that social protection will become more or less prominent on the 
development agenda in the next five to ten years? Why? 
2. What do you think will be the most important issues and debates within the social 
protection discourse in the next five to ten years? 
Prompt for whether the following topics will rise or decline: 
• cash transfers versus food assistance 
• conditional versus unconditional transfers 
• cost-effectiveness across instruments 
• decentralisation and local governance 
• delivery mechanisms 
• dependency 
• extending coverage to the informal sector 
• financing 
• graduation 
• grievance and complaints mechanisms 
• inclusive growth 
• informal social protection 
• labour market linkages 
• national ownership 
• resilience 
• rights-based approaches 
• scaling up 
• systems-building 
• targeting versus universal programmes. 
3. What do you think are likely to be the most important factors shaping the evolution of 
the social protection agenda in the coming years? Why? 
Prompt for disaggregated responses by five ‘drivers of change’ categories: 
• economic • political • social • technological • environmental 
4. Who do you think are likely to be the most important actors shaping the future social 
protection agenda? How and why? 
5. Do you think that there will be major differences in the way the social protection 
agenda evolves in different global regions? (e.g. between Latin America and Africa 
and South Asia.) Or do you think there will be a convergence across regions? Why? 
6. Can you comment on how you think social protection will evolve in one specific region 
that you know well? 
We should try to get at least one respondent to comment on each major region: 
• Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
• sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
• North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) 
• Eastern Europe and Central Asia (or former Soviet Union) 
• South Asia 
• East Asia (especially China) 
7. What do you think will be the main practical challenges regarding building national 
social protection systems in the coming five to ten years? 
Differentiate between the challenges: 
• for different actors – national and local governments, development partners, civil 
society 
• at different levels – global, regional, national, sub-national 
8. Do you have anything else to add that you have not yet mentioned? 
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Annex 2 Overview of Foresight methodology 
The three principal forecasting methods used in this project were: 
 Drivers of change analysis (‘STEEP’) 
 Scenario-building, using the ‘two-axes’ method 
 Options testing (‘Windtunnelling’) 
Below is a brief overview of these methods. For more in-depth explanation, and alternative or 
complementary approaches, see the Foresight Scenario Planning Guidance note.3 
1. Drivers of change analysis (‘STEEP’) 
A group of participants identifies major trends and drivers of change, usually in a workshop. 
Participants draw on their knowledge and awareness of different kinds of information, 
including research and horizon-scanning data, economic and demographic models, political 
and legislative trends, and cross-country analysis. They also apply their judgment and 
intuition to assess which drivers of change will play an important role in shaping future trends 
and outcomes relevant to the topic they are looking at. 
We use the STEEP framework to ensure that there is coverage of Social, Technological, 
Economic, Environmental and Political factors. In discussion, participants identify the ten to 
15 most important and most uncertain drivers for the period under consideration. 
Figure A.1 STEEP drivers of change 
 
Source: Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science (2009) 
                                               
3 www.soif.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Foresight-Scenario-Planning-Guidance-2009.pdf (accessed 8 January 2015) 
Drivers of Change 
T 
Technology 
Changes in 
InfoComms,  
New Media, 
Engineering, 
Sciences 
P 
Politics & 
Government 
Changes in 
Government 
Policies, 
Guidelines, 
Political Emphasis 
etc.  
S 
Social  
Changes in  
Demographics and 
Lifestyles 
Social Trends 
(family structures, 
income age, 
nationality, 
diversity etc.) 
E 
Economy 
Changes in 
Economy,  Macro & 
Micro -  
Industry Trends, 
Economic Policies 
& Performance, 
Foreign Direct 
Investments, Flow 
of Funds & 
Spending 
E 
Environment 
Changes in  
Living & Built 
Environment, 
Environmental 
issues (stakeholder 
expectations, costs 
of compliance, 
green reporting 
etc.)  
‘STEEP’ is a mnemonic for things (Driving Forces) that are 
changing in the Contextual Environment  
What are the “S-T-E-E-P” Forces that have an 
impact on our chosen Scope? 
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2. Scenario building 
One of the most common approaches to build scenarios is the ‘two-axes’ method (also 
known as ‘axes of uncertainty’). 
Four scenario ‘spaces’ are constructed, based on the two most uncertain and highest impact 
drivers identified in the STEEP drivers of change exercise. Each scenario is written up as a 
narrative of what the world in each of the quadrants is like for the people living in it. 
Figure A.2 Example scenario building using two-axes method 
 
Source: Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science (2009) 
The scenarios provide alternative versions of the future, relevant to the policy or plan you are 
developing. They are not predictions of the future, but plausible versions of what could 
happen in discrete and contrasting futures. 
  
From	World	Trade:	Possible	Futures,	UK	Foresight	Horizon	Scanning	Centre,	2009	
Scenario example – Future of World Trade 
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3. Options testing (Windtunnelling) 
Having broadened our perspective on the future through the drivers of change and scenarios 
exercises, this third method focuses on the implications of the different scenarios (possible 
futures) for policy choices. 
Windtunnelling is used to assess how a set of policies or objectives would perform in 
different scenarios. We first identify the policies or objectives to be ‘tested’. This can be done 
by reference to an existing (or draft) strategy; alternatively, candidate policies can be 
formulated by groups in a workshop exercise. 
Once policies have been identified, participants examine how effective the policies are likely 
to be in each scenario. Policies that perform well in several scenarios are considered to be 
more ‘robust’ that those that are well adapted to only one or two scenarios. 
Figure A.3 Windtunnelling template 
 
Source: Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science (2009) 
For examples of windtunnelling, see the annex to the Foresight Scenario Planning Guidance 
note. 
 
  
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Policy/ 
objective 1 
J J K L 
Policy/ 
objective 2 
Policy/ 
objective 3 
Policy/ 
objective 4 
J	
K	
L	
=	robust	
=	needs	modifica on	
=	does	not	work	
Windtunnelling template 
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Annex 3 List of key informants 
 Name Organisation 
1 Arup Banerji World Bank 
2 Armando Barrientos University of Manchester 
3 Michael Cichon International Council on Social Welfare 
4 Sarah Cook United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) 
5 Nicholas Freeland Independent consultant 
6 Matthew Greenslade Department for International Development (DFID) 
7 Arjan de Haan International Development Research Centre (IDRC) 
8 Lisa Hannigan Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia 
9 John Hoddinott International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
10 Nicola Hypher Save the Children 
11 Stephen Kidd Development Pathways 
12 Gabriele Köhler Independent consultant 
13 Anna McCord Independent consultant/ODI 
14 Richard Morgan Save the Children 
15 Isabel Ortiz International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
16 Katherine Richards Save the Children 
17 Michael Samson Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) 
18 Rachel Slater Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
19 Timo Voipio Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland 
20 Jenn Yablonski UNICEF 
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Annex 4 List of workshop participants 
 Name Organisation Workshop I Workshop II 
1 Francesca Bastagli Overseas Development Institute (ODI)  X 
2 Chris Béné Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X  
3 Stephen Devereux Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X X 
4 Matthew Greenslade Department for International 
Development (DFID) 
X X 
5 Sung Kyu Kim Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X  
6 Dolf de Lintelo Institute of Development Studies (IDS)  X 
7 Richard Longhurst Institute of Development Studies (IDS)  X 
8 Allister McGregor Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X X 
9 Fred Merttens Oxford Policy Management (OPM) X X 
10 Richard Morgan Save the Children X X 
11 Luca Pellerano Oxford Policy Management (OPM) X  
12 Keetie Roelen Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X X 
13 Alun Rhydderch Horizon Scanning X X 
14 Rachel Sabates-Wheeler Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X  
15 Ana Solorzano Sanchez Institute of Development Studies (IDS) X  
16 Phillipa Tadele ITAD  X 
17 Martina Ulrichs Institute of Development Studies (IDS)  X 
18 Fabio Veras International Policy centre (IPC)  X 
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